Exotic tree species predominate in reforestation in tropical regions worldwide. However, some native species are suitable for plantations, providing a wider variety of products. Adequate government programs of incentives, coupled with good technical advice to farmers, are needed to stimulate reforestation, especially among small and medium-sized farmers with limited financial resources. This project evaluates growth of native and exotic tree species on plantations in small and medium-sized farms in the Atlantic humid lowlands of Costa Rica, Central America. A total of 210 pure plantations, ranging in age from 6 to 11 years, were evaluated on 123 farms that had used government incentives for reforestation, and had received technical advice from local non-government organizations. For each species, seven plantations were chosen at random for study. In each plantation, plots of 15 trees each were chosen systematically for evaluation of diameter at breast height (dbh), total height, number of trees per hectare, tree form and spacing. Terminalia amazonia (J.F. Gmel) Exell, Hieronyma alchorneoides Allemao, and Vochysia guatemalensis Donn. Sm. were the most frequent species found in plantations in the region of study. Gmelina arborea Roxb. (exotic) and V. guatemalensis (native) had the highest mean annual diameter increment with 2.90 and 2.59 cm, respectively. Calophyllum brasiliense Cambess. (native) had the lowest mean annual diameter increment (1.48 cm). G. arborea and V. guatemalensis had the highest mean annual volume increment, followed by Tectona grandis (L.f) Lam. (exotic), and T. amazonia and Cordia alliodora (R&P) Cham. (both native). Although G. arborea had the greatest mean annual diameter increment, it had the lowest plantation density and problems with form. V. guatemalensis and T. amazonia, two native species, were the most promising species for reforestation, due to good growth in volume, good form, and adaptability to a variety of sites. The poor form of exotic species was related to the low intensity management methods of small farmers. Exotic species had the highest performance variability between sites, while native species showed relatively high growth homogeneity. Therefore, native species seem more promising than exotics for general use across varying ecological conditions.
Tag: incentives
Impact on incentives on the development of forest plantation resources in Indonesia, with emphasis on industrial timber plantations in outer islands
Current and Future Perspectives on Forest-Water Goods and Services
Report on incentive design for agroforestry in developing countries
To achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals, we see the importance of agroforestry in terms of both its potential environmental benefit and its development benefit, especially in developing countries where the dominant economic activity is agricultural production.
Towards improved natural resource management in African agriculture
This paper draws together lessons learned as to how governments and donors might stimulate necessary investment in improved natural resource management (NRM) in African agriculture. Policy interventions to support improved NRM are presented. These policy interventions are built on 5 points: investment, incentives, information, inputs, and institutions.
Biodiversity offsets and payments for environmental services: Clarifying the family ties
Biodiversity Offsets (BO) and Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are sometimes used interchangeably to characterize innovative economic tools to conserve or restore biodiversity, ecosystems, or their services. We assume that a confusion between PES and BO can have negative implications for biodiversity conservation. In this paper, we argue that these two tools follow different targets and have different founding principles, and thus, their basic mode of functioning would only coincide under special circumstances and institutional contexts. Here, we propose a new definition of BO, delimiting them more clearly from PES, and use practical examples to underscore conceptual differences. Both tools require specific policy framework conditions, in terms of rights, responsibilities, and enforcement. If unmet, however, the implications for biodiversity conservation outcomes are stronger for BO than for PES since BO are explicitly linked to biodiversity losses, while PES typically are not. PES experiences can certainly inform BO implementation vis-à-vis contract design and enforcement, but these PES lessons need to be enacted vis-à-vis BO specific requirements, in order not to underestimate generic risks in their implementation: if a PES scheme fails, payments can be stopped; if a BO fails, biodiversity losses remain.
Interaction of Conditional Incentives for Ecosystem Conservation with Tenure Security: Multiple Roles for Tenure Interventions
This chapter examines the role of tenure in conditional incentives for ecosystem conservation, often known as PES or payment for ecosystem services. PES systems that mimic market exchange require that resource tenure be clear and uncontested. In practice, there are different levels of conditionality in PES and different types of tenure challenges. REDD+, or Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, was initially conceived as a PES system embedded in a global exchange of carbon credits, thus requiring secure forest tenure. We examine one global initiative to achieve that, the Dedicated Grant Mechanism for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities. Cases in Peru and Indonesia illustrate how tenure interventions can both enable implementation of conditional incentives and become part of those incentives.
Biodiversity offsets and payments for environmental services
Biodiversity Offsets (BO) and Payments for Environmental Services (PES) are sometimes used interchangeably to characterize innovative economic tools to conserve or restore biodiversity, ecosystems, or their services. We assume that a confusion between PES and BO can have negative implications for biodiversity conservation. In this paper, we argue that these two tools follow different targets and have different founding principles, and thus, their basic mode of functioning would only coincide under special circumstances and institutional contexts. Here, we propose a new definition of BO, delimiting them more clearly from PES, and use practical examples to underscore conceptual differences. Both tools require specific policy framework conditions, in terms of rights, responsibilities, and enforcement. If unmet, however, the implications for biodiversity conservation outcomes are stronger for BO than for PES since BO are explicitly linked to biodiversity losses, while PES typically are not. PES experiences can certainly inform BO implementation vis-à-vis contract design and enforcement, but these PES lessons need to be enacted vis-à-vis BO specific requirements, in order not to underestimate generic risks in their implementation: if a PES scheme fails, payments can be stopped; if a BO fails, biodiversity losses remain.
Making conservation incentives work for Indigenous People and local communities: Insights and recommendations from Peru
Key messages
- Achieving global climate goals requires mutually beneficial partnerships between states, Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IP&LCs).
- Conservation incentives present implementation challenges and can result in potential conflicts, injustices, gender inequality, and loss of cultural values for IP&LCs.
- Peru’s Conditional Direct Transfers illustrate the risks and benefits that come with incentive programmes for IP&LCs, with some best practice lessons for those implementing similar programmes.
- Participatory decision making, supporting community administrative capacity, data sharing, and inclusion strategies will facilitate transparent, mutually beneficial partnerships with IP&LCs.
- An effective integrated approach requires collaboration between different institutions, government offices, and local, regional, and national experts.
Permanence of avoided deforestation in a Transamazon REDD+ project (Pará, Brazil)
Rigorous impact evaluations of local REDD+ (reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation) initiatives have shown some positive outcomes for forests, while well-being impacts have been mixed. However, will REDD+ outcomes persist over time after interventions have ended? Using quasi-experimental methods, we investigated the effects of one REDD+ project in the Brazilian Amazon on deforestation and people’s well-being, including intra-community spillover effects (leakage). We then evaluated to what extent outcomes persisted after the project ended (permanence). This project combined Payments for Environmental Services (PES) with sustainable livelihood alternatives to reduce smallholder deforestation. Data came from face-to-face surveys with 113 households (treatment: 52; non-participant from treatment communities: 35; control: 46) in a three-datapoint panel design (2010, 2014 and 2019). Results indicate the REDD+ project conserved an average of 7.8% to 10.3% of forest cover per household and increased the probability of improving enrollees’ well-being by 27–44%. We found no evidence for significant intra-community leakage. After the project ended, forest loss rebounded and perceived well-being declined – yet, importantly, past saved forest was not cleared. Therefore, our results confirm what the theory and stylized evidence envisioned for temporal payments on activity-reducing (‘set-aside’): forest loss was successfully delayed but not permanently eradicated.